Herman Melville's final novel, The Confidence-Man, unsettles conventional Western ethics by exposing and challenging their basis in rationality and a progressivist model of history. In this late work, Melville shows rationality to be nothing more than one way, among many other possible ways, that human beings attempt to fix the world in their understanding and justify their moral choices. I use these insights from The Confidence-Man to shed light on Melville's opposition to the missionaries' work of civilizing and converting the South Sea Islanders in his earlier travelogues. In Typee, his first novel, Melville demonstrates that layers of existence-in fact, real human lives-are denied when the story of human relations is framed as a narrative of progress. This article concludes by proposing that Melville attempts to rework the idea of failure as a potential strategy against the totalizing narrative of advancing rationalism.
The Confidence-Man takes this lacuna as its starting point. Revealing a pronounced inclination toward the postmodern, the novel takes for granted a lack of truth behind the many facades of its title character and of humanity in general. It presents a world that is thoroughly artificial, and it also makes clear that Melville's concern is not with the emptiness that we find beneath the labels, masks, and names, but with what this emptiness means in terms of our ability to think and act morally. It seems that at some point between the writing of Typee and the novels of the late 1850s, the object of Melville's interrogation shifts from issues of epistemology to those of morality, and it is possible to distinguish the set of questions raised in Pierre and The Confidence-Man from those raised within the travelogues of the decade prior. The narrator of Pierre, for one, demonstrates an acute awareness of a fundamental divide between the issues that trouble the novel's protagonist and the questions posed by a priest with whom he is compared: "With the priest it was a matter, whether certain bodiless thoughts of his were true or not true; but with Pierre it was a question whether certain vital acts of his were right or wrong" (Melville 1996a, 205 ).
Melville's novels up to, and including, Moby-Dick seem, like the priest, preoccupied with the question, Is there truth behind appearances?-whereas Pierre and The Confidence-Man rather dispense with this epistemological question and replace it with a moral one. These final novels presuppose a universe that either contains no truth or allows no possibility of reaching any truth behind appearances, and from here they probe what the impossibility of knowing truth might mean for conceptions of human agency and moral values.
My study examines Typee, Pierre, and The Confidence-Man, tracking the unfolding of a sustained, though not always consistent, interrogation of the complex interplay of morality, the interpretation of surfaces, and the construction of power in Melville's writing. With the aim of clarifying Melville's hypotheses regarding the ethical implications of a universe emptied of truth, I begin with a discussion of The Confidence-Man. Chronologically the last of Melville's novels, it in many ways instructs on how to read the earlier texts, providing a lens through which the author's findings in his earlier novels may be brought into greater focus. I suggest that The Confidence-Man theorizes many of the experiential discoveries of the narrator of Typee with regard to the ethical questions that both novels raise. I demonstrate, for instance, the ways in which The Confidence-Man critiques the theoretical assumptions upon which are founded conventional models of benevolence, such as those described in I present a view that partially supports Rowland Sherrill's assessment, in his influential study on Melville, that Melville's work before Moby-Dick reveals the author's strong belief that his speaking in fictive forms "could be effectual, and, therefore, that changes of cultural perception were possible" (Sherrill 1979, 3) precisely through the reading and writing of novels. Sherrill marks a sharp distinction between the early Melville and the Melville who continues writing after the commercial disaster that was Moby-Dick, suggesting that an important break happens with regard to Melville's belief in the capacity of narrative to effect real change-to promote morality and justice in the real world. Sherrill's reading would trace in Melville's works a collapse into tragedy: where the early texts, like Typee, bespeak the author's belief in the potential of literature to effect radical social change, the texts of the 1850s, according to Sherrill, reveal that Melville "despaired" and felt ultimately "unempowered to alter the direction in which life runs" (237).
Indeed, for all its concern with scrutinizing the meaning of morality within the novelistic framework, we shall see that The Confidence-Man ultimately ironizes the possibility of real benevolence. It not only insists upon the absence of truth; it also turns the construction of any ethical program into a joke-laughing, it seems, in the face of a profound failure. However, countering Sherrill's conclusion, I suggest that it is possible to locate in Melville's writings a viable alternative to this nihilistic perspective, the tragedy that Sherrill describes. For this, I turn to Pierre. In the final section of my article, I discuss the ways in which Melville's penultimate novel presents not a means of avoiding moral failure but rather a way of understanding failure differently. Targeting the domestic novel in particular, Pierre uncovers the imperialistic tendencies of Western narrative practices and explores possible modes of resistance and a different way of restoring moral agency. It presents failure as a moral option, a means of refusing to participate in the machinations of empire and the enforcement of sanctioned truth. So much of Pierre-ironically, for a novel about a novelist-rails against novel writing because of the way the activity cleans up the contingencies of experience and requires them to fit into an overarching pattern or system. Combined with the insights gained from The Confidence-Man and Typee, my reading of Pierre suggests that what matters for Melville is not merely the artificiality of these narrative constructs but rather the manner in which they help to sustain the unjust treatment of individuals who fall outside the prevailing norm. Pierre brings to the fore its own insufficiency at fulfilling its readers' expectations and, in doing so, makes a claim for the value of choosing failure in the face of the totalizing mechanism of a progressivist history.
Reading and Ethics in The Confidence-Man
The Confidence-Man, arguably the most enigmatic of Melville's novels, is composed of a number of episodes, all of which may be interpreted as the various encounters of a single trickster, or con man, with the other passengers on board the riverboat Fidèle. Using an array of disguises, the trickster mingles among the "multiform pilgrim species" (Melville 2006, 17) traveling along the Mississippi, soliciting the charity-and just as often provoking the ire-of his accidental companions. As he trots out one bogus exterior after another, the con man makes it impossible to ascertain whether or not any of these facades reveals his true self, or whether there is anything at all resembling our common notion of a fixed identity beneath these artifices. Through this indeterminacy, it is quite possible to read The Confidence-Man, alternatively, as a discontinuous cluster of vignettes, an aggregate of self-contained episodes, each involving a perhaps completely different set of personae altogether. The text is replete with clues, for sure, supporting a reading that follows the chicanery of one confidence man. In the third chapter, for example, the con man, disguised as Black Guinea, describes many of the incarnations he will later take on (21), and there are many instances in which a piece of intelligence about one of the benefactors is garnered by the con man under one disguise only to be used to his advantage as he takes on a different persona in a subsequent episode.
Along this line, Peter Bellis points out that the evidence in the text identifies and characterizes a single confidence man; "but," he writes, "the contexts in which such 'evidence' appears work to undermine rather than sustain interpretive certainty" (1987, 550) . The fundamental ambiguity of the text with regard to the singularity of the confidence man's identity bears mentioning as it contributes to a more general point about selfhood that the narrative strives to establish. The con man may well be Black Guinea, or the gentleman with the mourning weed, or the employee of the Black Rapids Coal Company, or the herb doctor, or Frank Goodman-or he may be all of these, one individual assuming these surface transformations in series. In any case, the uncertainty built into his characterization serves to create a disconcerting sense of the unreliability of any outward evidence in substantiating one's identity.
The microcosm of mid-nineteenth-century American society depicted by The Confidence-Man is likewise unstable; it is an ever-shifting world. The fluid Mississippi River provides the volatile and meandering backdrop to the con man's dialogue with his fellow passengers. The setting is described by the narrator thus:
As pine, beech, birch, ash, hackmatack, hemlock, spruce, basswood, maple, interweave their foliage in the natural wood, so these varieties Tartar-like picturesqueness; a sort of pagan abandonment and assurance. Here reigned the dashing and all-fusing spirit of the West, whose type is the Mississippi itself, which, uniting the streams of the most distant and opposite zones, pours them along, helter-skelter, in one cosmopolitan and confident tide. (17) The positioning of the novel's operations upon the serpentine waters of the Mississippi accentuates the instability of characterization and setting, which is significant both in terms of the point about the nonessential quality of "visage and garb" that the narrative makes and also in terms of the possibilities this affords the con man as he engages his exploits. An exchange between the cosmopolitan and the mystic Mark Winsome reveals, indeed, that a "Mississippi operator" is a term for an "equivocal character" (198)-a synonym for "confidence man." Moreover, the novel shows strangeness to be an important feature of riverboat travel-"at every landing, the huge Fidèle still receives additional passengers in exchange for those that disembark; so that, though always full of strangers, she continually, in some degree, adds to, or replaces them with strangers still more strange" (15)-and the confidence man, as much as the narrator, uses it to his advantage. Rick Mitchell's description of the Fidèle is apt: "Constantly in flux as it prepares to land in the next port, and the next one, where it embarks and disembarks passengers, the riverboat is also a liminal space which, in The Confidence-Man, is conducive to strange, ephemeral interactions where instability and deception is the norm" (2004, 52) . Additionally, as much as its passengers, the boat itself may be mistaken for something other than what it is-according to the narrator, "the Fidèle . . . might at distance have been taken by strangers for some whitewashed fort on a floating isle" (15)-and the con man avails himself of the facility for dissimulation that such strangeness affords.
The constant loading and unloading of the riverboat's passengers allows for discontinuity in their characterization, and the novel hyperbolizes this notion of the fluidity of identity to such a degree that finally every character may be assumed to be affected. So much of the con man's energies must be spent in dispelling doubt precisely because doubt is everywhere. We see this, for instance, as the man in gray speaks with the wooden-legged man, who is leery of Black Guinea: "Tell me, sir, do you really think that a white could look the negro so? by the inscrutable "whiteness of the whale" (Melville 2002, 159) . With regard to the truth of identity, The Confidence-Man trades description or explanation for a series of questions and the negation of the possibility of any answer:
"What are you? What am I? Nobody knows who anybody is. The data which life furnishes, towards forming a true estimate of any being, are as insufficient to that end as in geometry one side given would be to determine the triangle" (2006, 194) . When Frank Goodman's appeal to Charlie produces no monetary boon, Charlie's departure shows him "seeming disdainfully to throw off the character he had assumed," leaving Frank to wonder "where exactly the fictitious character had been dropped, and the real one, if any, resumed" (223-24).
Character is something that can be assumed and dropped at will, and a reading of some critical responses to the novel is helpful in developing a sense of the wider significance of this lack of authenticity.
Susan Ryan (2000) In fact, the novel describes so many different manifestations of charity that ultimately it seems the only feature common to all the distinct enactments of the word is the way in which the choice whether or not to engage in a chari- perceptions and judgments, worked to unsettle the hierarchies structuring benevolent exchange" (692). Thus, within each character solicited by the con man, the novel makes palpable a "natural struggle between charity and prudence" (Melville 2006, 53) , the feeling of being obliged to demand the vouchsafe of "documentary proof, any plain paper" (21) before giving alms-for if a benefactor could be duped into aiding the unworthy, then the management of this exchange would no longer be in his or her power. It falls under the control of the vagrant, the one who possesses the ability to manipulate appearances.
If, as Bellis points out, the body of a beggar such as Guinea is "a text whose interpretation will establish its reality as a body" (1987, 559) , then it follows that enacting charity-in the sense of "benevolence or generosity," as well as "tolerance" and "trust," or, more generally, "goodness"-is, in The Confidence-Man, completely reliant upon our reading of surface appearances. Melville's particular unease with conventional philanthropy is thus seen to derive from an anxiety that is concomitant with our reading processes.
The novel shows that any attempt to answer the question of the practicabil- the reader with a bewildering proliferation of characters and descriptions"
(1998, 117)-that is, they perform the same sort of work, as the body of the confidence man and the body of the text, in a similar fashion, produce readers. As much as we can see that charitable actions and our ability to navigate through textual material are fast entwined, we can also see that both charity and reading have a powerful way of luring us into believing that it is possible to perform a "correct" reading of a text or of another's identity-that in the profusion of data and sense impressions available to us, some underlying truth awaits our recognition. The bait, however, is set only in order to expose how readily we are conned by this fiction.
At several moments, The Confidence-Man conducts the reader to an awareness of the textual quality of itself-of itself as a fictional text-as well as the reader's position as the reader of that text. Chapters 14 and 33, in particular, call attention to this relation of reader to text, chiefly by anticipating the reader's objection to its own failure as a novel to satisfy reader expectations with regard to consistent characterization. "It may be urged," the narrator offers, "that there is nothing a writer of fiction should more carefully see to,
as there is nothing a sensible reader will more carefully look for, than that, in the depiction of any character, its consistency should be preserved" (Melville 2006, 75) . In addition, the narrator suggests, the reader looks for realism, exacting a "severe fidelity to real life" and objecting, he imagines, to "how unreal all this is" (186). One implication that emerges has to do with the common assumption that consistency is a mark of truth-the more consistent a character is, the more we see him or her as being realistic, as "telling the truth"-as well as the reciprocal notion, that inconsistency signals untruth. These equations are inverted in the novel, as the narrator challenges novelistic portrayals that seek to convince readers of their realism by describing characters that are unchanging, whose actions and words always hold together: "That fiction,
where every character can, by reason of its consistency, be comprehended at a glance, either exhibits but sections of character, making them appear for wholes, or else is very untrue to reality; while, on the other hand, that author who draws a character, even though to common view incongruous in its parts, as the flying-squirrel, and, at different periods, as much at variance with itself as the caterpillar is with the butterfly into which it changes, may yet, in so doing, be not false but faithful to facts" (75).
For Melville, the "revelation of human nature on fixed principles" (76) is a lie, and not the merely amusing and mostly irreproachable kind of lie that fiction might be taken to be, but an insidious and, as we shall see, destructively totalizing kind of lie. Ryan's analysis of the system of benevolent exchange, set alongside Melville's critique of representation-and the accountability that he attaches to it-brings to the surface the extent to which the notion of charity in his last novel is imbricated with our reader expectations and, moreover, places the argument for an a priori basis for morality within just such a problematic system of (mis)representation and (mis)reading. For Kant, if ethics is at all possible, it must be derivable from a universal principle-"the supreme principle of morality"-meaning that "our knowledge of it is independent of any particular experience" (Kant 1998, 5) . In other words, ethics cannot be based on experience for, as Kant points out, we can have no experience of every possible event"; therefore, it can be known "on the basis of reasoning alone" (ix-x). Christine Korsgaard explains that for Kant, "the laws of reason are not something we find in the world, but rather something we human (mis)readings that we perform on the world as it appears to us. As much as
Melville's last published novel expresses a cynicism toward charitable acts, the real thrust is directed at the artifice-rationality-that motivates the enactment of philanthropy. If we impose labels, masks, and names upon the raw material of subjective experience-and I argue below that Melville insists upon not only the reality, but indeed the violence, of this imposition, as early
as Typee-and if all we have access to are surfaces and appearances, then
reason cannot be anything more than another interpretive method or reading process with which we attempt to fix the world in our understanding and then justify our moral choices.
This may go some way toward explaining the joke in Moby-Dick, which advocates dispensing altogether with Kant, who is represented as the ponderous whale's head hoisted upon the ship's side along with another head representing John Locke, also a rationalist: "So, when on one side you hoist in Locke's head, you go over that way; but now, on the other side, hoist in Kant's and you come back again; but in very poor plight. Thus, some minds for ever keep trimming boat. Oh, ye foolish! throw all these thunder-heads overboard, and then you will float light and right" (Melville 2002, 261 is unnecessary to take into account any aspects-for example, pleasure or displeasure-that belong "to an empirical doctrine of the soul." He is concerned only with the "question of objective practical laws and hence of the relation of a will to itself insofar as it determines itself only by reason" (Kant 1998, 36) . In
Melville's novels, we detect numerous signals that this rationalist account of moral compulsion is inadequate.
Rather than a direct censure of rationality as such, The Confidence-Man achieves its critique of Kantian ethics through an indirect and illogical method-a rascally one, indeed-that unsettles rationality's bias toward objectivity and logical consistency. Already, we have noted the narrator's summary dismissal of the reader's demand for consistency in his arch commentary on the lack of consistency with regard to human character in reality. According to Mitchell and Snyder, " The narrator cites the non-normative productions of nature as his proof that consistent characterization is nothing more than literary market convention" (2006, 57) . The novel favors the creation of "duckbilled characters"-illogical and inconsistent figures that express the complexity and downright unreadability of identity-and argues, "He, who, in view of its inconsistencies, says of human nature . . . that it is past finding out, thereby evinces a better appreciation of it than he who, by always representing it in a clear light, leaves it to be inferred that he clearly knows all about it" (Melville 2006, 76) .
Citing similar reasons, Charlie rebuffs Frank's entreaties for a loan because, he asserts, there is no consistency in individuals-though his wording contrives to make it seem as though he refuses to grant the loan rather for
Frank's sake than his own:
"Would you, in your present need, be willing to accept a loan from a friend, securing him by a mortgage on your homestead, and do so, knowing that you had no reason to feel satisfied that the mortgage might not eventually be transferred into the hands of a foe? Yet the difference between this man and that man is not so great as the difference between what the same man be to-day and what he may be in days to come. For there is no bent of heart or turn of thought which any man holds by virtue of an unalterable nature or will." (222)
Charlie's report of the misfortunes of China Aster also corroborates his opinion that the illusion of consistency in human characterization is not to be trusted. China Aster turns victim through a "friendly loan" (221) from Orchis, as Orchis changes from generous benefactor to merciless usurer, demonstrating what he himself calls "the unstableness and deceitfulness of the human heart" (217).
In The Confidence-Man, if anyone could be described as at all objective and consistent, we could only point to those "practical Christians" designated by the Missourian bachelor farmer, which are, of course, machines.
The man from the Philosophical Intelligence Office-yet another of the con man's incarnations-solicits the Missourian, marketing, as he claims, some trustworthy boys and men of whose dependable labor the farmer could avail himself on his fields. The Missourian proves "a hard case," having Martha Nussbaum has pointed out that one of the limitations of Kant's ethics has to do with the notion that a moral law or principle "can never conflict with another moral rule" (1986, 31). According to Nussbaum: "The requirement that objective practical rules be in every situation consistent, forming a harmonious system like a system of true beliefs, overrides for Kant our intuitive feeling (which he acknowledges) that there is a genuine conflict of duties. . . . To say anything else would, for Kant, be to weaken the strong conceptual bond between duty and practical necessity, and between both and logical consistency" (31-32). Interestingly, Nussbaum advocates attending to "our intuitive feeling" when it comes to making moral judgments as an alternative to relying solely upon the principles of logic and consistency. For Nussbaum, as for Melville, a truly viable ethical program has to take seriously the multiplicity of allegiances, the multifarious and often contradictory commitments possessed by an individual at any given moment.
Melville makes it clear, particularly in the exchanges between Charlie and Frank, that "the best man, as the worst, is subject to all mortal contingencies" (Melville 2006, 222) . Morality is a difficult matter precisely because individuals have many allegiances-moral commitment is never a matter of following a straight line leading to a single objective. Charlie and Frank, for instance, demonstrate the conflict that ensues as one attempts to reconcile the demands of friendship and those of business. Frank presses on with his supplication for a loan from Charlie-now that they are "business friends," he pleads, surely Charlie will trust him with a sum of money. In return,
Charlie pointedly asks him, "Are you a centaur?" (206) A further critique of rationalist ethics is found in the exchange between the man in gray and the gentleman with gold sleeve-buttons, in which the con man (in his gray garb) purports to have devised a logical solution to the problem of want. He describes his prospectus for an institution that will impose the universalization of benevolence: "'The World's Charity is to be a society whose members shall comprise deputies from every charity and mission extant; the one object of the society to be the methodization of the world's benevolence;
to which end, the present system of voluntary and promiscuous contribution to be done away, and the Society to be empowered by the various governments to levy, annually, one grand benevolence tax upon all mankind'" (47-48). In his justification of a society in which charity will be universally enforced, the con man appeals to reason to validate the practicability of such a project-but the gentleman responds in a manner that again serves to undermine any such assumptions regarding the rationality of individuals: (48) . Surmising that all citizens the world over-being rational persons, all-would readily submit to the methodization of charitable giving that he proposes, the con man envisions a time when the World's Charity will have amassed and redistributed such wealth that it will have eliminated poverty altogether and thus rendered itself obsolete. Ironically, as the con man projects the logical end of the institution's project of universal benevolence, he arrives at the inevitability of its dissolution.
The critique of universalism here prefigures the section in which Frank describes to Charlie the ubiquity of "geniality" in the modern world:
"By the way, talking of geniality, [remarks Charlie,] it is much on the increase in these days, ain't it?" "It is, and I hail the fact. Nothing better attests to the advance of the humanitarian spirit. In former and less humanitarian ages-the ages of amphitheaters and gladiators-geniality was mostly confined to the fireside and table. But in our age-the age of joint-stock companies and free-and-easies-it is with this precious quality as with precious gold in old Peru, which Pizarro found making up the scullion's sauce-pot as the Inca's crown. Yes, we golden boys, the moderns, have geniality everywhere-a bounty broadcast like noonlight." the Marquesans is that it covers over the deaths of thousands of islanders and the brutal expropriation of their territory by "the rapacious hordes of enlightened individuals who settle themselves within its borders, and clamorously announce the progress of Truth" (Melville 1996b, 195) .
Fictions of Reform in Typee
Claiming to represent "the unvarnished truth" (Melville 1996b , 2) about the Marquesas Islands and their inhabitants, Typee contests the primacy of Enlightenment-inspired descriptions of the civilizing mission in the remote islands. The first of Melville's novels to be published, it presents itself as an autobiographical as well as an anthropological account of the author's sojourn in Nuku Hiva in 1842. Early on, Melville demonstrates an awareness of "something decidedly wrong" (Melville 1996b, 198) his meaning by "suddenly catching this exasperating opponent by his shabby coat-collar, and shaking him till his timber-toe clattered on the deck like a nine-pin" (Melville 2006, 23) . Similarly, the story of Goneril-as it is glossed by the man from the Black Rapids Coal Company-demonstrates a connection between violence and conversion, as he remarks, suggestively: "'The truth probably was that she was a wife with some blemishes mixed with some beauties. But when the blemishes were displayed, her husband, no adept in the female nature, had tried to use reason with her, instead of something far more persuasive. Hence his failure to convince and convert'" (71). Violence, the con man implies, is the expedient required for a hasty and thorough modification of Goneril's deficiency of virtue. Even more extreme, the Missourian farmer, denouncing all manservants and boys as rascals, calls for their annihilation outright-he longs for the day when machines will finally "announce the era when that refractory animal, the working or serving man, shall be a buried by-gone, a superseded fossil." He muses on, fantasizing: "'Shortly prior to which glorious time, I doubt not that a price will be put upon their peltries as upon the knavish 'possums, especially the boys. Yes, sir (ringing his rifle down on the deck), I rejoice to think that the day is at hand, when, prompted to it by law, I shall shoulder this gun and go out a boy-shooting'" (121). Indeed, the tacit as well as the unequivocal affirmation of violence as a condition of reform or conversion can be found in many exchanges throughout the text.
As the confidence man propounds the excellence of a project of universal benevolence, he suggests rather than describes the exclusionary vehemence that such a project would entail. "You see," he says, "this doing good to the world by driblets amounts to just nothing. I am for doing good to the world with a will. I am for doing good to the world once for all and having done with it. Do but think, my dear sir, of the eddies and maëlstroms of pagans in China. People here have no conception of it. Of a frosty morning in Hong Kong, pauper pagans are found dead in the streets like so many nipped peas in a bin of peas. To be an immortal being in China is no more distinction than to be a snow-flake in a snow-squall. What are a score or two of missionaries to such a people? A pinch of snuff in the kraken. I am for sending ten thousand missionaries in a body and converting the Chinese en masse within six months of the debarkation. The thing is then done, and turn to something else." (50) This picture of rapid conversion sits comfortably only with one who expects to find the Chinese willing-absolutely yearning-to be converted. Such an ambitious undertaking in reality would always entail the use of force to subjugate those who resist conversion, and the project of "doing good to the world with a will" and "having done with it" is ultimately a project of destruction.
Therefore, against the model of a progressive history, Melville's travelogues deploy-as does The Confidence-Man-what some critics have termed a "rover"
ethic, a wandering perspective that resists linearity, resists being governed by the norms of any particular trope or genre. These texts, moreover, refuse any serious political or religious allegiance, and likewise repudiate reductive hierarchic binaries, as we have seen in the treatment of the terms civilized and savage. Tommo protests, "How often is the term 'savages' incorrectly applied!" (Melville 1996b, 27) , in a manner that serves both to loosen the customary attachment of the term to any non-European and to recast his own countrymen and -women under the same designation. He points out a fallacy in many accounts of "cold-blooded robberies, kidnappings, and murders" perpetrated by natives upon travelers in the Pacific: "How we sympathize for the unhappy victims, and with what horror do we regard the diabolical heathens, who, after all, have but avenged the unprovoked injuries which they have received. We breathe nothing but vengeance, and equip armed vessels to traverse thousands of miles of ocean in order to execute summary punishment upon the offenders.
On arriving at their destination, they burn, slaughter, and destroy, according to the tenor of written instructions, and sailing away from the scene of devastation, call upon all Christendom to applaud their courage and their justice" (27).
The reports of native brutality that infuse Americans' imaginings of foreign encounters often conceal the abominable actions of the visitors that provoked them in the first place. Ruefully, Tommo surmises in another chapter, "The missionaries may seek to disguise the matter as they will, but the facts are incontrovertible; and the devoutest Christian who visits that group with an unbiased mind, must go away mournfully asking-'Are these, alas! the fruits of twenty-five years of enlightening?'" (124) This passage, moreover, pointedly observes that the destruction of the natives' habitation is authorized by "written instructions," reminding one of the manner in which Melville connects moral behavior and textuality in The Confidence-Man.
In Typee, then, Melville's attack against the missionary endeavor seems founded upon some of the very same anxieties that inform the system of benevolent exchange depicted in The Confidence-Man. In part, the text of Typee serves a cautionary purpose, warning Western philanthropists, who buy into the published testimonies of conversion and the progress of civilization, against the instability of charitable offerings, which results from the problems of misrepresentation, both intentional and unintentional. "Those who from pure religious motives contribute to the support of this enterprise,"
urges Tommo, "should take care to ascertain that their donations, flowing through many devious channels, at last effect their legitimate object" (198).
More than a cautionary tale, however, Typee activates what seems to be an incipient awareness of the problematic connection between our practices of representation and reading, on the one hand, and the possibility of enacting our good intentions, on the other. Examining the early development of this particular awareness, it is evident that from the beginning of his writing career
Melville is intensely preoccupied with the potential of a text to manipulate the philanthropic impulses of its readers.
Typee thus paints a picture of civilization as a text upon which the problems of reading and of ethics intersect, and often collide. It is clear at this point that Melville's critique of confidence in his final novel is ultimately-to use Radloff's phrasing-"directed against the fundamental lie of philanthropy, and the 'bene-volence' it claims to represent" (1996, 4) . In Typee, as in The Confidence-Man philanthropy-whether it is called "charity" or "benevolence"-in any particular instance, is always imbricated with the ideology of reform and the progressivist assumptions that buttress it. Radloff emphasizes, "The cosmopolis of The Confidence-Man . . . signifies an order of instrumental rationality which appeals to reason, 'benevolence,' 'confidence,' as cultural values that serve the secret fanaticism of a public opinion in turn devoted to the 're-formation' of the 'natural' man" (2-3). Because it privileges the commitment to reform above all else, the predominant reading of intercultural contact has the function of occluding the deaths of thousands.
For this reason, Melville troubles the notion of reform in his novels.
The confidence man's exchanges with the Missourian farmer, for example, lampoon a strong cultural bias toward narratives of reform: young boys-all rascals, in the farmer's opinion-are presented by the con man as "incipient creatures" that, with the proper instruction, will transform into efficacious laborers. To an imagined person who proposes to return an adult servant to the Philosophical Intelligence Office upon hearing "something unfavorable concerning [the servant] from some gentleman who employed said adult long before," the con man argues, "Madam, or sir, would you visit upon the butterfly the sins of the caterpillar? In the natural advance of all creatures, do they not bury themselves over and over again in the endless resurrection of better and better?" And against the Missourian's protests, the con man counters with several examples of "caterpillars" transformed into "butterflies," rakes who later prove to be "crude material for the saint": "There's the founder of La Trappe, and Ignatius Loyola, in boyhood, and someway into manhood, both devil-may-care bloods, and yet, in the end, the wonders of the world for anchoritish self-command." In addition, he offers the example of St.
Augustine, who himself "confesses that, until his thirtieth year, he was a very sad dog" (Melville 2006, 129-30) . All these examples demonstrate the cultural predilection to overlay the story of human life with an account of reform-the story of "the endless resurrection of better and better."
It makes sense that The Confidence-Man takes up an ironic panegyric of the American press, as it is, after all, "one of the most powerful human agencies that can be employed in forming the mental and moral character of the inhabitants" (Suzuki 2007, 369) in our practices of reading or reasoning-is no better than machinery, no more substantial than the emptiness one finds behind the impositions that we call "theory" and "metaphysics" and "truth." Therefore, when Frank eulogizes the press as "the iron Paul" (171), we get the sense of something utterly discomfiting about the way the press is often used to advance the depredations of the civilizing mission.
The reach of the influence of the press proves difficult to evade. Often, we see in Tommo's expressions the manner in which he seems inadvertently to replicate the missionary rhetoric of conversion in the abstract, even while condemning its practical execution (in more than one sense of the word).
For instance, he implores, "Let the savages be civilized, but civilize them with benefits, and not with evils; and let heathenism be destroyed, but not by destroying the heathen " (1996b, 195) . His designation of savagery and heathenism adheres to the common usage of these terms, imbued as they are with an inferior status, and promotes our duty to ameliorate the natives' benighted condition-even though, paradoxically, his plea is for a more tolerant manner of relating to these individuals. Sherrill points out, "Tommo discloses bonds with civilization so strong that he cannot free himself from them" (1979, 24) .
Surely, Typee goes some way toward exposing and challenging the fiction of human improvement that sustains the Polynesian Mission; but in many ways, the novel also repeats the very same rhetoric that it problematizes so well.
Typee, it might be argued, is a much easier novel to swallow-certainly, it Thus, though they want novelty, they want nature, too; but nature unfettered, exhilarated, in effect transformed" (Melville 2006, 186-87) . The problem is that, like the man with the mourning weed who tricks the country merchant by offering to "supply the void in [his] memory" (28), the author of the novel also aids in proliferating the fiction that sustains the lie of philanthropy. shams, yet still drinks away at them" (167) Pierre remains a testament to the limits of literature as a force for political reform." According to Rowe, Melville's disillusionment with the novel form is evident, as he registers "how powerfully these forms contribute to the social forces of domination they so often claim to contest" (1991, 196) . of Christianity "proved entirely impracticable" (215); it has also been used to mask incalculable brutalities.
Melville then follows his vision of "the Empire of Human Knowledge"
with an appeal to action: "If among the deeper significances of its pervading indefiniteness, which significances are wisely hidden from all but the rarest adepts, the pregnant tragedy of Hamlet convey any one particular moral at all fitted to the ordinary uses of man, it is this:-that all meditation is worthless, unless it prompt to action, that it is not for man to stand shillyshallying amid the conflicting invasions of surrounding impulses; that in the earliest instant of conviction, the roused man must strike, and, if possible, with the precision and the force of the lightning-bolt" (169). It is the author's duty, the narrator of Pierre seems to argue, to act on his convictions. However, the author's position is one steeped in paradox. All the world "acts," as we have seen in the above discussion of The Confidence-Man, yet there is the sense that any action inevitably fails to strike through the mask of righteousness. Itself a novel, Pierre ultimately is faced with its own limitations-its fundamental inability to actually resist the lie that inheres in the method of representation. The efforts of Pierre as a novelist-like those of Melville-reveal a self-conscious awareness of the manner in which novels only add to the artifices that sustain power: "For the more and more that he wrote, and the deeper and deeper that he dived, Pierre saw the everlasting elusiveness of Truth; the universal lurking insincerity of even the greatest and purest written thoughts. Like knavish cards, the leaves of all great books were covertly packed. He was but packing one set the more;
and that a very poor jaded set and pack indeed. So that there was nothing he more spurned, than his own aspirations; nothing he more abhorred than the loftiest part of himself" (339). Pierre's activity resembles Melville's own writing of Typee, insofar as it represents a process that ensures the unceasing rehearsal of the conditions of power. Paradoxically, the more intensely Pierre attempts to get at the truth behind appearances through his writing, the more his pages end up merely adding to the strata of misperceptions, thus effectively rendering the attainment of that truth ever more out of reach.
In the end, like the pamphlet on "Chronometricals and Horologicals"
that Pierre finds on his journey, the novel Pierre is "more the excellently illustrated re-statement of a problem, than the solution of the problem itself" (210).
Given that advancing any solution or any truth would only serve to pack "one set the more" of knavish cards, the narrator of Pierre rather opts for a kind of failure. At several moments, the novel declines to fulfill its narrative function-it refuses to narrate, for example, Pierre's wrangling with his extraordinary predicament of being in love with his half sister: "Here," the narrator states, "we draw a vail [sic] ." Rather than describing or explaining Pierre's struggles, the narrator maintains, "Some nameless struggles of the soul can not be painted, and some woes will not be told. Let the ambiguous procession of events reveal their own ambiguousness" (181). The "reason-originating heart and mind of man" longs for explanation within the "imperfect, unanticipated, and disappointing" text, but the text withholds explanation of the moral failure embodied by Pierre's illicit love-the mysteries of Pierre's life, it claims, "are not so easily to be expounded" (209). Desisting from using words or reason to attempt to clear up these mysteries, the text instead renders the impression of "a divine unidentifiableness" (89).
Self-consciously, the narrator describes the method of his own narration: "This history goes forward and goes backward, as occasion calls" (54).
He depicts the life of Pierre as "mutilated stumps" because, as we have seen, the effort to fit the contingencies of human life into an overarching pattern amounts to mere pretension and even to a kind of imperialism. In this manner, the narrator evades the work of conventional literature, in which "all 
